Concepts of Philosophy. By ALEXANDER THOMAS ORMOND, McCosh Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906. Pp. 720. 17s. net.

THIS is an attempt to construct an idealistic system of the univers It attracts admiration for its comprehensiveness, its clearness, and for many incidental merits, but judged as a coherent system there is much to criticise.

The author begins (p. 12) by a demonstration of the reality of consciousness. If anything is real, consciousness must be real, for what is real is "real only to consciousness". This next stage is, "if consciousness be real, then it is the great reality, and will supply the criteria of all reality". Asking what consciousness is, we are told that "from its very form as effort or agency it will be primarily volitional" (p. 13). And since this volition is selective, we may call it "purposive," and regard metaphysics as essentially teleological (p. 16).

On this demonstration the whole system appears to rest, since the author relies continually, in the course of his further arguments, on the result thus reached, that reality must be looked at teleologically, if it is to be looked at truly. It seems to be an inadequate foundation for such a superstructure. Undoubtedly, it is only through consciousness that *I know* anything else to be real, and I may possibly prove that my consciousness must be real by arguing that, whether I pronounce anything else to be real or unreal, my pronouncement implies a real act of consciousness. But to argue that because, if a table were real, I could only know it *through* consciousness, it follows that a table is only real *for* consciousness, is surely fallacious. It may be possible to prove that tables have no independent reality, but it will not be done so easily as this.

Thus, while Prof. Ormond may be justified in asserting that consciousness is real, he has not proved that "it is the great reality and will supply the criteria of all other reality". Neither would it follow from the fact (if it were a fact) that all consciousness is effort, that its aspect of effort is the most important thing about it, or that it is primarily volitional.

After the Introduction, the book is divided into three parts, one of Analysis, one of Synthesis, and one of Deductions. The first begins with a discussion of Consciousness as Knower, in which knowledge is divided into three branches—mathematical, physical and metaphysical, with the fundamental concepts of number, cause, and teleology, respectively. "Metaphysics," we are told (p. 38), "rationalises the world by presuming the uniformity and stability of the purposive agency of the world." If metaphysics is to be at liberty to "presume" trifles of this description, its work will turn out much lighter than most metaphysicians of the past have supposed.

The second chapter works out in greater detail the nature of the three branches of knowledge. The third chapter is entitled Methods in Philosophy and is almost entirely occupied with a discussion of Kant. In chapter iv.—The World of Existence—we have the distinction between objects and ejects. "This ink-bottle, for example, is object so far as it manifests itself to my perceptions. As object it is a manifested group of qualities. But the ink-bottle is also an eject. It is a persistent being which is not perception" (p. 101). The name eject seems rather inappropriate to designate the existence-for-self of any being, since it conveys a strong implication that it refers to something manufactured by the mind. Prof. Ormond obviously does not hold this, for on page 118 he speaks of "the great eject which we call God or the Absolute," and he holds God to exist for himself. Our conception of God, since it is necessarily partly anthropomorphic, might be called an eject, but to call God himself an eject seems—for a Theist—a misleading use of language.

The last chapter of the first part deals with Primary Certitudes. Among other matters, Prof. Ormond discusses the value of "belief-judgments". The highest type of these is the judgment that something must be real because it is "so related to a scheme of rational good that its non-existence would destroy the rationality of the system" (p. 133). He decides for the validity of real judgments, partly on the ground that "metaphysics is teleological". But teleology and effort towards the good are not necessarily connected. All that the author has proved, even on his own showing, is that the universe must be looked at by the aid of the idea of intelligent effort. Now the activity of Nero, or of Milton's Satan, or of the God of certain past theologies were cases of intelligent effort. But a universe ruled by such beings would be one in which, the better a thing was, the less likely would its existence be.

The word rational is rather dangerously ambiguous. Its primary and most usual meaning refers to truth only. And thus when it is said that the non-existence of anything would destroy the rationality of a system, it seems as if its non-existence had been refuted by an ordinary *reductio ad absurdum*. But Prof. Ormond uses rational as a value-term. "Of course," he says (p. 135), "the best is the most rational." Now, if rational is used in this sense, the fact that the non-existence of anything would destroy the rationality of a system is not the slightest ground for rejecting its non-existence, unless you have previously connected the two meanings by proving that what is evil is either self-contradictory, or contradictory to admitted facts. This Hegel, for example, tried to do. But without this—and it has no place in Prof. Ormond's work—to argue from one use of rational to the other is as unjustifiable as an argument from the lawn in a garden to the lawn of a bishop's sleeves. The mistake may not, psychologically and etymologically, be as gratuitous, but logically it is quite as fallacious.

The second part is again subdivided, the first division being entitled "From Physics to Sociality". Here, after an introductory chapter, the author deals with Physical Activities and then with Organic Activities. The latter chapter contains a more detailed discussion of Evolution than is perhaps appropriate in a work on philosophy. On page 176 there is an important passage: "We cannot be satisfied to rest in a theory of the world that excludes intelligence and finality from its heart". The proof of this apparently is that, unless intelligence is supreme, the ultimate explanation of things would be "mere accident or blind fate". But, after all, all explanation must be based on something which is not explained. If we take the explanation which ultimately satisfies Prof. Ormond—that of Theism—the existence of God is a fact which we should only be able to recognise. We could not say how or why he existed, but only that he did exist. God's existence is not due to intelligence, for it is due to nothing, and if the theories of Pantheism or Materialism are to be condemned as referring things ultimately to accident or blind fate, I do not see how Theism can be said to be in a better position. There are various grounds on which Theism might be defended as a better explanation of the universe than Pantheism or Materialism, but it no more avoids an inexplicable ultimate than any other theory.

Conscious Activity and The Mental and Physical are the subjects of the next two chapters. In each chapter the question turns up of the real nature of objects which are *primâ facie* material. The conclusion is that their true nature is probably spiritual. The discussion is able and interesting, and it is a painful shock to come across a passage like this: "Why should there be anything deeper than phenomena, or more profound than the parallelism of the two orders? Simply because consciousness in its organ of reason will not have it so. A world which ended here would be a scandal to reason" (p. 255). Here again we are left in complete darkness as to whether Prof. Ormond means that he would disapprove of such a world, or that he would commit a logical error if he believed in it. The former is interesting, but inconclusive. The latter would be better if it were not put in a form which suggests that a contradiction becomes impossible only when it is perceived to be a contradiction.

The rest of this subdivision consists of three chapters on Society, which are more psychological and sociological in their interest than philosophical. It is to be noted, however, that the author regards human society as merely a means. "The social organism is not an end in itself. It is, in the last analysis, a function of individuals in social interaction and it exists as a means for the development of the individual's life" (p. 327).

At the end of the discussion of Society comes a transition to Theism. "The social consciousness supplies no principles of final unification. The social world as a whole is thus left to accident

and blind fate, *unless we rise to a final synthesis in which the world-movements as a whole are conceived as organised and guided under an all-comprehending thought and purpose.* . . . The final metaphysical implication of sociology seems to point to an eternal consciousness in which the world-movements as a whole are conceived and purposively directed to a unitary end" (p. 332). And again, "an all-comprehending purpose is a form of agency which can be exercised only by consciousness that is able to relate itself in like manner to every part of the real, and, therefore, to *reality as a whole.* Some eternal consciousness that shall be the adequate bearer of an all-comprehending purpose, seems, therefore, to be the last postulate of metaphysics" (p. 335).

The argument does not seem to take account of the possibility that the ultimate synthesis might be the system formed by the connexion of the finite selves—not, of course, their connexion in present society, but their ultimate and eternal connexion. Such a system would, I suppose, be condemned by Prof. Ormond as a mere brute fact, but it does not appear very evident why it is to be condemned on this ground any more than the equally ultimate fact that there is a God, and that he has this particular purpose.

It might be said that the previous conclusion that the universe is to be looked on teleologically requires that it shall be conceived as the result of the purpose of a conscious being. But here there seems a dilemma. Either it is sufficient to conceive the *activities* of the universe to be produced teleologically. This would be the same if the whole of reality was a system of selves, since the activities of selves can be regarded teleologically. Or it is essential to explain the existence of the *substances* in the universe as the results of purpose. Then Prof. Ormond's theory must itself be condemned, since it does not regard the most important substance of all—namely God—as the result of any purpose. For God is not a result at all.

We now pass to the second subdivision of Synthesis, entitled From Sociality to Religion. The first chapter deals with Ethical Activities, in which we may note that the author regards the concept of "*ought, obligation,* or *duty*" as more central than the concepts of right and good (p. 341). In the next chapter the discussion of Freedom seems to fail in clearly distinguishing between Materialism and Determinism. Supposing that our determining causes were all spiritual and all teleological, we might be as inevitably determined as on the most Materialist theory. Such determination need not be either self-determination or determination to the good. If those theologians had been right who held that God had, for his own glory, predestined certain men to damnation, the cause of their damnation would have been spiritual and teleological.

After a short chapter on Emotion and Rationality Prof. Ormond passes to Religion. He considers that "the idea of religion could

not arise in the experience of one who had not in some way become conscious of relatedness to some mysterious being outside of himself that impressed him as being superhuman; that is, free from some of the ordinary limitations of humanity, but that, notwithstanding, was in many respects also like man himself—a being of his own order, yet in a sense superordinary. It is in this synthesis of the *ordinary* human and the *superordinary* that we seem to find the pith of the consciousness that may be called religious. Let us attempt to cancel either factor, and religion vanishes, leaving in its place either the purely social or a mere sense of mystery that does not know whether to be religious or not" (p. 416).

Chapter v. deals with the Origin and Development of Religion. The theory put forward by Prof. Ormond on this subject would have to be judged by empirical anthropology. It has no bearing on the author's general philosophical position.

Two chapters are then occupied by the discussion of the characteristics of various religions. The conclusions reached may be summed up generally in the propositions that religions are higher as they approach to Christianity. In particular, the author regards the ideas of God, mediation, sin, and salvation, as essential to a satisfactory religion.

The argument then proceeds to the consideration of The Individual and the Eternal. "We ask . . . are the divine purposes always victorious? and we answer in the affirmative, for we cannot conceive God as being defeated in his purpose" (p. 526). Is sin then (to say nothing of other forms of evil) no defeat of the divine purpose? The answer appears to be that sin will not win in the long run. "In the long run when ultimate results are counted" the wicked man "will find that the instruments which he used for evil have conserved the good end which he hates" (p. 529). It would seem from this that the temporary predominance of evil has nothing repugnant to God's nature in it. Prof. Ormond can scarcely mean this, but, if he does not, how can he deny that God's purposes are to some extent defeated?

The author goes on to accept personal immortality, resting his belief largely, though not exclusively, on an ethical argument suggested by Kant's treatment of the subject (p. 531). The second part closes with a chapter on Sin and Retribution, chiefly remarkable for the light-hearted way in which pain is pronounced not to be an evil. ("We may then exclude pain, as Nature's life-warden, from the category of evil," p. 537.) Of course pain often prevents greater evil—very frequently this greater evil is simply greater pain, but not always. And in this case it is better to have the pain than to have the consequences of its absence. But this gives no ground whatever for asserting that the pain in question is not evil although it may, the world being what it is, be the only alternative to a worse evil.

The third part begins with a chapter on Method. This is

followed by a discussion of Nature, in which the following may be moved: "the uniformity we predict in Nature is simply the congruity of its movements with the fundamental aims of living; it is, in short, a prediction that Nature in relation to the fundamental aims of life will be rational, orderly and good" (p. 589). Doubtless our life could not, under present conditions, exist for an hour if we had not the uniformity of Nature to guide our actions. But does the uniformity of Nature assure us that Nature will be in harmony with our fundamental aims? If all men were doomed to become increasingly miserable and wicked through endless time, how would that conflict with the uniformity of Nature?

Then follow chapters on the Idea of God, the Nature of Man, Freedom and Destiny and Man's Environment. In these, however, the author confines himself to working out the fundamental ideas which he conceives himself to have already established, and space does not admit of tracing his deductions in detail. The book ends with a discussion of the Will to Believe which Prof. Ormond is not prepared to accept as fully as the Pragmatists, while he does not altogether reject it.

There is very much that is interesting in *Concepts of Philosophy*, but I doubt if it leaves Idealism any stronger than it found it.

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Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften. Von A. MEINONG. Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1907. Pp. viii, 159.

THIS book is a defence of Meinong's views against various critics, and a further explanation of the new science which he calls "Gegenstandstheorie". The necessity and importance of this science are vindicated, and reasons are given for not identifying it with logic or theory of knowledge or any other science which has hitherto received a name. The style is remarkably clear, and the polemical arguments appear to the present reviewer to be generally cogent, except (needless to add) when they are directed against himself.

After a brief introduction, Meinong proceeds to consider what he calls "homeless objects," by which he means the non-existent objects of presentations which do or may exist. Such are, for example, colours: these are not mental, for they are quite distinct from presentations of colours, and they are not physical, for they do not exist in the material world. (This might be questioned; but as Meinong has argued the question elsewhere, he is content to assume the result of his previous discussion.) Thus although presentations of colours exist, colours themselves do not exist. Yet there are many true propositions about colours, *e.g.* that black differs from white. To what science are such propositions to be